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Military Affairs

by M. A. Gareyev

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
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Attempt at Giasnost Results in Dismissal

18010240 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Apr 88 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col V. Gavrilenko "A Lesson—Restructuring: The Position of the Communist"]

[Excerpts] At first Andrey Zhelnov was advised, and then warned, not to ask "naive" questions. No one could or would give a direct answer for various reasons. In reality, who could say why the unit command hid the fact of the loss of four tires from a trolley under the care of Maj A. Bakhurin? When the question was put point-blank, as they say, and the officer demanded an investigation, he was immediately proposed for discharge from the armed forces. And he was discharged. And the extraordinary occurrence was concealed. Why are the personal vehicles of Col V. Mirgorodskiy and Lt Col V. Shirokopoyas stored on unit premises in hidden and covered accommodations? Why was a freshly slaughtered piglet from the mess subsidiary farm put into the commander's vehicle and taken outside the military settlement? Why are the soldiers repairing the quarters of V. Shirokopoyas and working at the dacha of a relative of the commander? Why do the wives of the commanders work here in materially responsible positions and under an exceedingly easy regime?...

These are not all of the facts that troubled Warrant Officer A. Zhelnov. They multiplied day by day, as if everything that was happening in life and all of the enormous changes in the country had no relation whatsoever to their unit. Zhelnov could not reconcile himself to this. Not heeding his very experienced comrades-in-arms, he reported all of this to an officer from higher headquarters who had come to the unit one day for an inspection.

There are constantly representatives of higher headquarters and organizations in the units and subunits. And urgent requests and questions are naturally directed toward them. How important it is here to be as attentive and principled as possible, since in any other case these comrades are discrediting not only themselves, but—which is perceived as more acute—the level of leadership they represent. Having heard what Warrant Officer Zhelnov had to say, Col V. Liznev promised a careful investigation of everything, but he left that same day. And Col V. Mirgorodskiy began the "investigation" after he left.

Calling Zhelnov into his office, he harshly and unambiguously warned him "So, Zhelnov, you're our most principled person here, eh? But we've also had enough of them, these principles. Think about it..."

This was a signal. Events moved along. The warrant officer was punished.

It is worth discussing this punishment in more detail, it seems. He was punished for the performance of sentry duty. Being commander of the patrol, Zhelnov found a sleeping private in inspecting the posts. He took the necessary steps as envisaged by regulations. He reported it to the commander the next morning. After a few days, he received a reprimand. I would note that some of the punishments that were subsequently imposed on him were clear violations of legality and were later protested by the procurator, and some were the result, as they say, of "snaring" Zhelnov with malice aforethought and a juggling of the facts. In short, he was punished nine times over a little more than six months. He was deprived of summer leave under specious pretexts, and they created very difficult conditions for his work—forcing him to take on additional stores under his supervision, and moreover in the course of a single day.

Zhelnov understood: they would not forgive him for the effort to wash dirty linen in public. He then appealed again for support, this time to the political department. They simply brushed him aside there. He began writing to various authorities and spoke at an open party meeting, although he was not a party member, and declared there that he was being persecuted for his criticism.

It must unfortunately be acknowledged that neither the communists nor the party organization secretary himself, Capt V. Tulinov, were able or willing (was it worth the risk) to help Zhelnov...

Events developed—the punishments piled up one atop another. He was demoted. He was warned of incomplete service conformity. He was then subjected to a comrades' court of honor for warrant officers, which discharged him from the armed forces.

Time passed. Discharged from the army, Zhelnov continued to stand up for his name. For the truth, believing that sooner or later he would be understood and someone would investigate everything. Meanwhile, verifications based on his statements were conducted just from the point of view of defending "the honor of the uniform" and a desire not to wash dirty linen in public. And if it was to be washed, then it would be the accuser's. They were thus one-sided, these verifications, and their focus became Zhelnov himself and his drawbacks and shortcomings. This led to the fact that the staff of the rear services of the PVO was soon confused. After a routine but more careful investigation of the statements of the obstinate warrant officer, procurator Col Justice A. Myskov made a report to PVO Main Staff on violations of legality in the unit commanded by Col V. Mirgorodskiy. It said that Zhelnov was right in reporting the abuses of the commander and his persecution for criticism. The procurator also categorized as illegal the decision of the court of honor for warrant officers and the discharge itself. Finally, everything had seemingly become clear. But Col L. Legkikh composed a new reply

to Zhelnov in which the procurator's report was repudiated: "You were not discharged for criticism, but by decision of the court." Such divergence of opinion.

And after all, very little was needed: to investigate everything conscientiously, as was done somewhat later by a procurator from the chief military procuracy, Lt Col Justice A. Rybchinskiy. He required no particular legal subtleties. He became convinced that the warrant officer's behavior was a conventional display of elementary honesty. Namely conventional, which should have been and remained the norm for our armed-forces activity. It should be welcomed and supported at all levels and in all officials. And the more so in party organizations.

After all, where didn't Zhelnov go, what doors didn't he knock on? There was complete lack of understanding behind them in the majority of cases. Maj Gen G. Lazer, the chief of the political department for units and institutions centrally subordinate to the PVO, who had received Zhelnov, was also unable to penetrate to the essence of the conflict, as had other people who undoubtedly had much experience and were concerned for the interests of the cause.

It happens often: the desire to see model procedure and well-ordered life and service in subordinate units proves to be so strong that it obscures the truth. What is wished for, as they say, tramples and involuntarily simplifies the flaws in reality. Thus comes the conviction that there should not be and cannot be anything bad in the units, the more so during restructuring, when one wants to and even must report to higher-ups its first and expected advances. And an obstinate warrant officer cuts across here... That is why Zhelnov was perceived from the very beginning as a person trying to throw a shadow, to stir up the waters. After all, one cannot believe that Col V. Liznev, more often than others coming to the unit, did not know, for example, about the abuses of Mirgorodskiy. It is also difficult to believe that political worker P. Danilushkin did not know of the coarse actions of Mirgorodskiy with people. That he manipulated their sentiments in his own favor, that he trampled the party organization. Subsequently transferred to a new service post, Col V. Mirgorodskiy "showed himself" there as well, for which he was demoted and later discharged into the reserves.

Only the procurator from the chief military procuracy investigated everything in detail and submitted a report in which A. Zhelnov was justified, as they say, on all counts. And by order of the supreme commander, two years later, he was restored to his former rank in the ranks of the armed forces.

Conflict Between Regimental Commander, Political Officer

18010351 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Apr 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col I. Kushelev, Transbaykal Military District, under the rubric "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference": "Restructuring—The Bar of Exactness"]

[Text] The situation in the regiment was not simple. It forced me to take pen in hand. The following occurred: party buro secretary V. Demenchuk was unable to find a common language with the regimental commander. Of course, there are errors in the work of Vasiliy Dmitriyevich. They were not the cause of the difficulties that arose in mutual relations, however. The party secretary was too intolerant of shortcomings. He criticized the commander repeatedly at party meetings.

It was hinted to the party secretary that, they said, he should go a bit more softly... But Vasiliy Dmitriyevich followed the party line as before. And there were sharp discussions at the buro as before. And when it was time to confirm the routine evaluation of the commander, there were just words of criticism directed toward him once again. The secretary then delayed the regular promotion for half a year. The regimental commander did not sign the report.

The party secretary has many years of service behind him. Vasiliy Dmitriyevich also remembers a time when extensive decisions were made at party meetings, but they were frequently calmer now. Problems of combat training and discipline accumulated and piled up on top of each other in parallel with the swollen files of party minutes. And there was no end in sight to this process. Life beat on with heatedly at one pole, and at the other—they huddled from the bureaucratic cold of the paperwork...

Vasiliy Dmitriyevich tried to break the vicious circle. But many of his comrades-in-arms have a passionately different attitude toward this.

"Stop fighting, Dmitrich," his closets friends advised him. "Things will be as they were. Who are you? An executor, a functionary, so to speak. Sub-or-di-nate. Subordinate yourself to the general course..."

You don't hear much of that today. Restructuring changes people and their way of thinking. The attitude toward one's own actions and the actions of others requires a strict re-evaluation. This is sometimes frightening, knocking us out of our accustomed rhythm.

Vasiliy Dmitriyevich understands the new requirements. But is he in conformity with them? It is not an idle question for him.

"I'm not getting things done, there's no time... We have yet to achieve serious shifts in the restructuring of party work. We are discussing them more. But we need more action, concrete, palpable."

I know that the bar of exactingness has been raised appreciably in the regiment, and that personal demands of communists have been strengthened. The chief of armor services was expelled from the party. The deputy regimental commander for rear services received a strict

reprimand with a notation in the service file for omissions in the organization of everyday military life. Other command officers will be heard from. Some don't like this...

Of course, the principled nature of the party bureau secretary arouses respect. He is supported by the communists of many subunits. But it seems that a person whose soul burns for restructuring is obligated to support his commander first and foremost.

12821

Experiment: Assignment of Judicial Officers to Units

18010360 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Apr 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col Justice I. Vashkevich: "Legal Standards of an Officer. By Way of an Experiment. Legal Adviser Works at Division Headquarters Almost 2 Years"]

[Text] A fire occurred. The judge advocate's office conducted an investigation, and the guilty parties were punished. It seemed that an act [formal document], presented by an organization in the vicinity of the unit, could add little to an already miserable situation. Nevertheless, its result was that, in addition to everything else, an imported video set was lost in the fire, and its owners demanded that more than 20,000 rubles be transferred to them as compensation for the loss.

The new commander of the unit had no experience with this kind of a document, and he simply did not know how to handle it. Help came against all expectations. . .

At a regular meeting the commander of the division introduced a new colleague to the officers—Maj Justice Anatoliy Ivanovich Navalnyy, saying that henceforth he will defend the rights and legal interests of regiments [chast] of the division [soyedineniye] and of the personnel. It had been decided to conduct an experiment whose purpose would be the future improvement of the legal service of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

And the division legal adviser began his work on the ill-starred act. Soon the collected explanations of eyewitnesses, extracts from the protocol of the inspection at the scene of the incident, and other documents indisputably proved: the equipment mentioned in the act could not have burned because it definitely was not found at the scene of the fire. And after a certain time the official notification of the State Arbitration Commission came about the rejection of the unfounded claim on the unit.

"I will say frankly: the very style of work of many officers has changed with the assignment of a legal adviser to us," the division commander told me. "The people sensed how much more reliable it is to rely on the law in situations where previously they acted, as the saying goes, 'on a gut feeling' ['na glazok']. They began to turn more frequently to legal documents, to check out their actions and decisions in them, and to see to it that everything is done properly and justly, that is, within the context of the law."

Indeed, this attitude toward the matter is felt in everything: you get acquainted with the answer to a letter of a soldier's mother or an order on the state of military discipline, a decision about making someone financially responsible, or the resolution of differences in a military store.

Or this example. Officers of the armored service in my presence had a discussion with the legal adviser on the application of the commander of one of the regiments about writing off a tank engine. In a training session an inexperienced driver ran a tank into a hole with water, the engine was flooded and it broke down. The proposal: write off the engine and charge the guilty parties for the damage. This would appear to be formally proper, and it seems to be business-like.

"But in fact, it defrauds the state and limits the rights of the servicemen," Justice Major Navalnyy believes. "And this is why. A careful examination showed that the engine only required a takedown inspection. This means that there can be no question about a write-off. Accordingly, the amount of possible deductions changes. It turns out that to approve the application for a write-off is nothing other than a bureaucratic approach to the resolution of a problem which inevitably causes both the state and people's personal interests to suffer.

Senior Lieutenant S. Yukhov came by the legal adviser's office. He submits a draft order of the division commander for legal review: all documents of a legal nature undergo legal monitoring in the headquarters. On this occasion the question concerns the assignment of drivers to motor vehicles or other equipment during work in the training center. After reading the text, Navalnyy decisively crosses out a number of names from it.

"There is no need to assign people to a motor vehicle who as it is drive them on orders from other chiefs."

"In my opinion, it is never harmful to increase responsibility," the young officer tries to object.

"An order is legal. But in one regard it is two laws—it is not simply ignorance of the law, but the premise for lawlessness."

"I understand. . ."

He understands. . . Why then is legal nihilism so tenacious; that is, neglect of the demands of law, regulations, and the attempts to get along in one or another instance with "homemade" means? Because of the low level of legal standards [kultura], Anatoliy believes, and because of weaknesses in legal training and education.

It is almost 2 years that Maj Justice Navalnyy has been working in his busy position with its almost boundless number of duties. Everyday advice to soldiers and assistance in command decision-making. Lectures to officers and discussions with the chairman of the comrades' officers' court of honor.

The results of the work of a legal adviser, most likely, can be expressed in figures also. For example, for not quite 2 years the number of legal violations in the division requiring judicial involvement decreased by more than

60 percent, incidents by 4.5 times, and serious disciplinary misdemeanors by 26 percent. Major Justice Navalnyy can be given credit for some of this.

But the division legal adviser himself prefers to handle figures with caution, which he also advises others to do. We ourselves provide the criteria for the calculations. And it is not an impassive machine that is conjuring up the computations, but a human being. This year, for example, Anatoliy Ivanovich does not exclude even the increase in misdemeanors being settled. For strictness has increased, and what could be passed over quietly yesterday is now taken into account. Is such a possibility alarming? Of course. But now it is according to another and different raised level of legal standard and an implacability to any deviation from law and order.

Meanwhile, the legal adviser's stay in the division is coming to an end. For this is only an experiment, although, judging by everything, it is also very promising. Steady appeals to strengthen legality and law and order and to raise legal standards are being reinforced by practical actions in inculcating the "Manual on Legal Work" and assimilating the "Legal Minimum for An Officer." What does Maj Justice Navalnyy think about this?

"Well, in general, I do not think I worked in vain," said Anatoliy Ivanovich, "and in the future, as ordered."

Then he adds:

"Incidentally, in the Hungarian People's Army there are legal advisers in regiments as well. . ."

13052

Insufficient Command Attention to Tactical Training

18010352a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Apr 88 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "Our Main Cause—The Commander Organizes Combat Training—He Who Doesn't Work Makes No Mistakes—One Must Be Competent to Teach"]

[Text] Who among the military doesn't know the words in the regulations that a commander (superior) is obliged to be the organizer and leader of the training and education of subordinates... Today, when the principal questions of theory and practice of their combat application and the thrust and content of training are being elaborated in accordance with the growing demands of the party toward the army and the navy and the provisions of military doctrine, they sound especially ponderable and significant, since to be the organizer and leader of training and education means to resolve the chief task of restructuring in the armed forces.

Yes, it depends first and foremost on the commander whether every class and all training meets in spirit and content the requirements of the party to raise exactingness in all sectors, the responsibility of personnel and the necessity of focusing on practical affairs and the accomplishment of good ultimate results. And many of them are striving steadily for this, displaying initiative, creativity and independence.

These commanders include, for example, Lt Col V. Chichko, about whom a letter was recently written to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. What is noteworthy in the style of his work? The regimental commander constantly has his finger on the pulse of combat training and requires this of all of his deputies and the commanders of the various units and services as well as staff officers. He is not reconciled to indulgences, simplifications and digressions from the plan for combat and political training and class scheduling and demands strict answers for every instance of the diversion of personnel from the training process. At the same time, Lt Col Chichko is working persistently on the development of his own organizational abilities and is improving his methods of commanding the regiment. The classes and training that he conducts himself are becoming an example of a creative attitude toward affairs. Much credit is due the commander for the fact that each in the regiment is aware of his responsibility for combat training and strives to make a contribution to improving it today.

The priority of combat training is unfortunately far from everywhere affirmed with such persistence and purposefulness. The causes vary. One of them in particular, as testified to by many letters by our readers, is the surveillance of the tactical-level commanders. "We'll see nothing better," passionately writes an officer of the command of X division, Lt Col V. Grinkov, to the editors on this score, "until we stop being distracted by the excessive surveillance of the leaders of the classes." And the letter's author further relates how, in the formation in which he serves, the organization of the training process is hindered by the fallacious practice of the petty surveillance of sergeants, warrant officers, junior officers and the endless "raids" of various sorts of commissions and inspectors from higher headquarters.

The alarm of the letter's author is understandable; after all, those who plunge into working in the new manner wholeheartedly, who are not afraid to err in the genuine cause, who feel themselves personally responsible for restructuring gaining momentum, are at risk and run into the blank wall of mistrust of what is new, indifference and formalism. It is largely for namely these reasons that combat training has yet to become chief and determining in the activity of some commanders of subunits, units and ships, they have not learned to look at it as a most important condition for ensuring the fighting ability of the troops and naval forces and a means of military education and raising organization and discipline. Such phenomena as the diversion of personnel from classes for various types of work have yet to pass away, due to

which combat training is of an emergency nature in some places, and systematic training is replaced with dressing up for inspections. Whence indulgences, routine work and oversimplifications. Many combat-training missions are worked through without the proper intensity.

This is especially characteristic of classes and training at which questions associated with the training of personnel for defensive actions are worked through. Some commanders themselves do not know how to teach their subordinates to use forces and equipment in defense and to ensure its stability under conditions of enemy superiority. The initiative is frequently earmarked for the opposing side in working through elements of defensive battle. Individual commanders lack the skills of organizing fire against the enemy.

The times require a turnabout in the style of leadership of combat training. Its quality can be understood only on the basis of the well-defined organization of the training process and all service in the units and on ships along with everyday, concrete and purposeful educational work aimed at affirming regulation order and the rational use of time and equipment. This naturally assumes raising the fighting spirit of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations in surmounting phenomena of stagnation and the confirmation of a businesslike atmosphere of mutual exactingness and intolerance of any manifestations of lack of official conscientiousness and irresponsibility.

The necessity of strengthening attention toward educating solely responsible commanders and developing execution, discipline and readiness to make decisions on complex issues, organize their execution and bear full responsibility for them is being felt with particular acuity today. There can be no discussion of training and educational successes with the personnel and the solution of the problems that arise in that regard if we do not achieve a firm knowledge by all officers of the principles of military science, the requirements of the military and soldier's regulations and manuals and programs (courses) of training. It is essential to improve the ideological tempering of the personnel more persistently, to develop their military, military-historical and military-technical standards and organizational and methodological skills in the process of command training.

There is still much for commanders, staffs, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations to do to arrange a mechanism for competition and put it at the service of combat readiness and the intensification of the training process. It must be cleansed more determinedly of the rust of stereotypes, and outmoded forms must be rejected. All of this will occur more rapidly and with greater effectiveness if everyone who is obliged through official duty to organize the competition guides it and heeds attentively the suggestions of its participants themselves—on how to carry out the work better, what to consolidate and what to reject.

The winter combat training is entering its concluding stages, and the white heat of competition in honor of the 19th All-Union Party Conference is growing. To bring the work in organizing the training and educational process and its guidance into conformity with the requirements of the times is to make a new contribution to raising the combat readiness of the army and navy.

12821

Proposal to Vary Draft Service Term by Completion of Required Training

18010352b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Apr 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Maj V. Nizov, Moscow PVO District: "I Want to Propose..."]

[Text] The search for new moral and material incentives to stimulate in people a vested interest in labor and a responsible attitude toward matters charged to them has proceeded more and more actively of late. This search has already borne fruit in connection with the conversion of many enterprises to economic accountability [*khozrashchet*], self-financing and self-support... But have new additional incentives appeared to stimulate the soldiers of the army and navy toward the same sort of labor?

One could object: just what new incentives are we discussing, they say, when there are the provisions of the USSR Constitution and the requirements of the military oath and regulations? Unfortunately, there are instances where even the application of the strictest disciplinary measures toward a negligent soldier are unable to alter his attitude toward service for the better.

Possible opponents could ask—what about the lofty awareness of our soldiers? A high civil awareness, a feeling of duty, honor, conscience—these are powerful concepts but, unfortunately, they have different power over different people.

I therefore feel it is expedient to make changes in the Law on Universal Military Obligation in the time periods for the completion of military service. To establish that the service term of soldiers and sergeants depends on their mastery of their military field, but not more, say, than three years in the Soviet Army. Discharge into the reserves is carried out after two years of service, but only with the passing of exams on all subjects of combat and political training.

Such legislation, in my opinion, would not contradict the USSR Constitution and, as a consequence, would raise the personal vested interest of servicemen in the ultimate results of combat and political training. It would influence the efficiency and quality of classes, make socialist competition more active in all aspects and would have a positive effect on reinforcing military discipline. Those who serve listlessly would be forced to extend.

For the purpose of the further development of democratic principles, it seems essential to create an examination commission in every unit with representatives of army society, unit commands, higher headquarters and political organs. It should have the right, at the end of every training period, to evaluate the knowledge of the soldiers subject to discharge and to render a conclusion regarding the readiness of the soldier or sergeant to defend the Motherland.

A unity of interests of commanders and subordinates in resolving the important state task that is army service will thus in effect be ensured, and undisciplined soldiers are at the same time forced to reckon with the opinion of army society and their comrades-in-arms.

In order to raise the responsibility of servicemen for the ultimate results of combat training, it would be useful, in my opinion, to introduce a military skills certification, or at least a special page in the service dossier, where evaluations of the examination commission on the subjects of training are shown via the passing of examinations on combat maturity when being discharged into the reserves are entered and certified by the signatures of the commander and the unit chief of staff...

My viewpoint is the viewpoint of an officer in the ranks—just one of many. Let there be others. Let's discuss it.

12821

Profile of Audio-Reconnaissance Specialization*18010359 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian**17 Apr 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Article by Maj N. Astashkin, Far Eastern Military District: "The Romance of Military Service. Audio-reconnaissance Specialists"]

[Text] It was just another hill. An innocent glance would hardly spot the traces of any human activity here, even less of military activity. However, several hours ago work here was in full swing: the commander of an artillery reconnaissance battery, Guards Capt S. Sergeychenko, decided to get one of his sound-ranging posts ready for operation.

This task is rather labor-intensive. Equipment must be set up and readied in regulation time, a topographic position survey has to be conducted, and communication has to be established with the main post. Finally, everything has to be camouflaged carefully.

I saw how all of these people took care of all of this under the command of Guards Sergeant A. Dovbni, chief of the post—with concentration, dexterity and a good attitude. And afterwards I had a talk with Aleksandr.

"You know," he said, "up to my callup I had not even heard that there was such a specialty in the army as audio-reconnaissance specialist. And now, speaking frankly, I simply cannot imagine another kind of job for myself. . .

Why did the young commander and his subordinates get to like audio-reconnaissance? The answer to this question might seem paradoxical—the difficulties. Guards Sgt Narzullo Narziyev and Guards Pvt Ali Khamukov, and other soldiers, spoke to me about them: This was the picture they drew: the "listeners" at times had to remain for hours in one and the same position. No stretching one's legs, kidding around or starting a bonfire. The normal "regulation" situation at a position is complete and absolute silence. The point is that the sensitive instruments react to the slightest sonic oscillations, and outside interference can break the rhythm of operations. That kind of immobility—during winter in the cold and in the summer under a pouring rain—is a primary test, especially for beginners. But a certain time passes, and the necessary skills are acquired, habits are developed and the will is strengthened.

But still, the soldiers told me, an audio-reconnaissance specialist is indeed a multipurpose military specialty. He has to be able to drive a motor vehicle, work the gyrocompass and the radio set, know the navigation equipment of a surveyor perfectly, and confidently orient himself in terrain. . . There is no denying that for young people the skills are enticing and can be useful in future life.

But let us see what takes place at an audio-reconnaissance post. An unusual device that is reminiscent of an old telegraph set attracted my attention. It is a recorder.

Guards Sgt N. Narziyev places a monitor tape with "quiet" lines in the set. As soon as "enemy" artillery goes into action, the tape fixes the characteristic splashes by which Guards Pvt Teyfur Mageramov quickly determines the type of weapons that are being fired, and the commander of the measuring and plotting section [izmeritelno-vychislitelnoye otdeleniye]. Guards Sgt Mikhail Dobryakov, issues the target coordinates.

There is a warning post forward of the battle formation. Its chief, Guards Sgt Tadzhdin Karamatov, is in rapt attention at the time of operations. He has a distinct appearance—binoculars are hanging on his chest, and he has a stopwatch in one hand and a tiny device with a button in the other.

"My job," explained Tadzhdin, "is to keep an assigned sector behind the enemy's forward defense positions under observation. After hearing the sound of a round, I press this button, which in turn starts the recorder. But before this I turn the stopwatch on when there is a flash or smoke from the round. When the sound arrives, I turn it off. This is the way target range is determined. Afterwards I determine by ear how many rounds the reconnoitered target fired."

. . . All of this information flows to Guards Sr Lt Yu. Semin, the platoon commander. After systematizing the information, the officer determines that the firing was conducted by a rocket launcher. But how many weapons are in the battery, and what is their caliber? This has yet to be clarified. . .

I will digress briefly to say that audio-reconnaissance played a considerable role in the years of the Great Patriotic War. During the period from July 1943 to April 1945 it took part in the largest operations in establishing the coordinates on an average of 90 percent of the total number of artillery batteries reconnoitered by all systems. Even the enemy was forced to admit the effectiveness of our audio-reconnaissance. "I bow before the accurate results achieved by your counter-battery fighting. Your audio-reconnaissance works well," said the chief of artillery of a Hitlerite army corps who was taken prisoner at Stalingrad.

But let us return to today. Guards Sr Lt Semin, comparing tape data with recordings of the sounds of the fired rounds, reports from posts about the firing activity of the adversary, and the target locations on a reconnaissance map, accurately establishes the number of firing weapons, their system, caliber and rate of fire, and conveys this information to the senior chief. The salvo of the battalion with which the audio-reconnaissance specialists cooperate is accurate.

Soon the motorized riflemen, making the most of artillery fire, go on the offensive. And the "listeners" moved to a new position. And once again they continued their intense search for sound.

13052

Continued Flaws in Air Force Personnel Assignment System

18010316a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Feb 88 p 2

[Unattributed article under the rubric "After a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Statement": "Formal Replies for the Collection"]

[Text] "Formal Replies for the Collection" is the heading under which a reply was published on 19 November 1987. It talked about the fact that annually during the period of graduation from VUZ's of the VVS [Soviet Air Force] we get letters from graduates saying that they were not assigned to their first officer positions according to the specialties that they had studied. The personnel directorate of the VVS has reported annually that measures have been taken to bar a recurrence of this in the future. . .

As was reported to the editorial staff by Maj Gen Avn V. Klimov, chief of an office in the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the facts cited in the reply are being corroborated. The Air Force has taken steps in all of the cases cited by the newspaper. At the present time, graduates of the Kirov and Kaliningrad military aviation technical schools have been reassigned to duties that correspond to their authorized specialties. Senior Lieutenant V. Pavlyuchenko was sent to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany as a replacement and also works in his specialty. Steps have been taken relative to graduates of the Kharkov higher military aviation engineering school. They are receiving mechanical engineering specialties in the operation and repair both of aircraft and helicopters, and they are being assigned to vacant positions in accordance with the education they received.

For the purpose of improving the quality of planning the distribution of graduates of military training institutes, new periods for the submission of applications by VUZ graduates from the districts and the services of the Armed Forces were reviewed and approved in December.

Maj Gen Avn V. Kobayakov, Maj Gen Avn L. Nedelkin, Col P. Sablin and other officials reported from the Ural, Turkestan, Transcaucasus and other military districts with regard to measures taken after publication. However, the editorial staff continues to receive letters from junior officers who were not assigned according to their specialties. Thus, Lieutenants Melnikov, Kornilov and others reported that they, military topographers, were sent to serve in the VVS. At first, work was found for them there, but now they do not work in their specialty. . . In the White Russian Military District, Lieutenant I. Daskalyuk—a graduate of the Kirov military aviation technical school is being retrained from helicopters to aircraft. Lieutenant V. Bilun from the Northern Group

of Forces also writes that he is not working in his specialty. In a word, it is a bit early to come to a conclusion about a complete resolution of the problem.

13052

'Protectionism': Abuses in Advancement of Two Junior PVO Officers

18010316 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Mar 88 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Simonov, officer of the administrative staff of a combined unit of the Air Defense Forces: "On a Critical Subject—To a Duty Assignment. . . Through the Back Door"]

[Text] I wanted to write about protectionism a long time ago, about a social evil which, in my opinion, is intolerable anywhere, but which under our army conditions is doubly and triply intolerable. I will submit for readers' consideration two stories that, it seems, are not yet finished.

So, the first story. Last April Lieutenant S. Kubochkin, called into the army after graduation from one of the civilian Moscow VUZ's, arrived at our unit for service. Beforehand, by a telephone call from above, requirements were dictated on setting him up. The first was that the place of service without fail had to be not far away from Moscow; second, he was to be pointed immediately to a captain's slot (indeed!); third, there were to be no personnel under supervision. More than one person was diverted to make arrangements for the "important" lieutenant, and the commander of the unit was also busy with this (of course, not because he wanted to be).

It was possible to satisfy the first and perhaps the third requirement, but, alas, there was no success with the captain's assignment. An entire operation on officer transfers was undertaken, but everything was stymied because of the refusal of Capt Yu. Butikov to change his work profile and transfer to a new place of service. By the way, this officer is one of the best trained specialists of the unit and is responsible for a very highly specialized sector of combat operations. The result was that the lieutenant had to be satisfied with the position of platoon commander. But within 11 months a report arrived at unit headquarters on the appointment of Kubochkin to a captain's slot in the administrative section of the unit. The lieutenant's efficiency report, which did not have a single deficiency, was written by Lt Col S. Mosolov. One observation should be appended to it: Kubochkin did not command the platoon one day, and he saw soldiers mainly at the traffic control post and from the window of his office.

As for his professional training, I will cite literally the resolution of staff officers of the unit written on the recommendation cover sheet: "A very poor officer. I do not concur with the recommended assignment. Lt Col N. Baralo. 4/02/1988." "Bad combined arms preparation.

Too early to promote. Lt Col A. Brutov. 5/02/1988." When I asked one of the officers working on personnel questions whether such reports would influence the way things were going, he replied: "They will not change anything. They are mosquito bites."

The second story. Several years ago they sent A. Gavryuchenkov to us, a graduate of the Kiev Higher Radio Engineering Air Defense School imeni Marshal of Aviation A. I. Pokryshkin.

He was being "pushed" by his father and father-in-law, both of whom were colonels who held influential posts in Moscow. The lieutenant, skipping his turn, received a comfortable apartment in the city. Afterwards papers were drawn up for his enrollment in an academy. Just before the enrollment an order was issued on the appointment of Senior Lieutenant A. Gavryuchenkov to a major's slot in the administrative section of the unit. To be fair, I will note that this was a diligent officer who worked a lot to improve himself. But another thing is also true: there are officers who are more prepared in a professional sense and more competent officers for enrollment in an academy and assignment to such a position. It is obvious that after the cited case the atmosphere in the collective will not improve. And people see: conscientious work over many years is not at all the main thing that is needed for service growth.

The result of such transfers also brings losses to the state. The specific character of our service is such that we begin to get a full return from an officer only after a year and a half of his intensive training. We are barely able to train a specialist and get him proficient before he is transferred to a cushy job. There they then train the officer in another specialty. It turns out that the expenditure is substantial but that there is no return. The moreso when it comes to officers who, having protection, behave like favorites for whom, for example, service in our unit is a springboard to the capital.

One would hope that the consciences of those would speak out who "dragged" junior officers A. Shchagin, A. Shevchuk and A. Mineyev to Moscow. The last officer followed a very intricate route to the capital. After

graduating from a military institute, he was put on orders to serve in the airborne assault forces. He was not there 2 years, and in good health and in excellent physical condition, when he was moved to an office job. Within 3 years he had a new assignment, to the capital, and again to a position that did not require parachute jumps, excellent health or the training that he got with the troops.

What is not understandable is that some officials and communists demonstrate unscrupulousness toward this disgraceful circumstance. Thus, the subunit in which Senior Lieutenant Gavryuchenkov serves has the largest party organization, but only Capt S. Churkanov openly condemned protectionism in the promotion of a junior officer. The other communists did not have the courage to do this. Is this really acting in a party way?

I would like to emphasize: protectionism contributes to pushing not only lieutenants up the service ladder. It is no secret that sometimes people with more solid ranks also push themselves to one or another position "through the back door." And no one is ashamed!

I think that those who give protection and who contribute to it deform the conscience of people and force them to resign themselves to injustice. Persons who practice protectionism betray our moral ideals. And those who utilize it in behalf of personal interests in essence steal positions from others who are more talented and industrious.

Today, protectionism, as well as other negative phenomena, is going, so to say, underground, and it is being camouflaged. This is being forced by the situation and by the fight that is going on against protectionism. The situation is changing in favor of justice. Nonetheless, the illness has not been cured entirely. But I am confident that it will be easier to cure it if everyone begins to respect his own dignity and to protect the dignity of comrades. If everyone will not remain silent but will call things by their own names. If everyone will become a fighter and do battle against this ugly phenomenon. For me, the beginning of this fight is this letter to the editor of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

13052

Port Call in North Korea

18010344 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 88 Second Edition p 5

[200-word article by Capt. 1st rank V. Shirokov entitled:
"Visit of Soviet Warships to the PDRK"]

[Text] On 12 May a detachment of Soviet warships sailing under the flag of the Commander of the Pacific Fleet Admiral G. A. Khvatov including the anti-submarine cruiser "Novorossiysk," the large anti-submarine ship "Admiral Zakharov," and the destroyer "Boyevoy"

arrived in the port of Wonsan (PDRK) on an official friendly visit. The Soviet sailors were met by the Commander of the Navy of the PDRK, Admiral [sic] Kim Il-chol, the Commander of the Eastern Fleet of the Navy of the PDRK, Vice-admiral Kwon Sang-ho, and the USSR's Ambassador to the PDRK G. G. Bartoshevich.

On the same day the Soviet sailors laid a wreath at the memorial to the Soviet soldiers fallen in the battles for the emancipation of Korea from the Japanese militarists.

UD/336

Lt Gen Redko Reflects on Restructuring in Military Education

18010347a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Apr 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Gen A. Redko, chief of the Ryazan Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering School: "Assume More"]

[Text] [Editorial Introduction] The song about the front-line driver is a song also about Anatoliy Petrovich Redko. It is his favorite song. Under bombing and shelling, the commander of the military drivers squad, Jr Sgt Redko, was delivering ammunition to the frontline and carrying wounded into the rear. After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the veteran sergeant became a motor vehicle officer. And now 30 years later, Lt Gen Redko is the chief of a military school, initially the Samarkand Higher Motor Vehicle Command School and for the last 4 years, the Ryazan Higher Engineer School. At present, in assessing what has been done and correlating the activities of the school collective with the tasks stemming from the decisions of the February (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, he reflects on the problems of the restructuring of the military school. [End of Editorial Introduction]

We were separated by a table. But it seemed to me as though the officer sitting opposite me and I were separated by an abyss of miscomprehension on his part of the need for the insipient shifts in the work style of the command and teaching personnel. The chief of one of the leading faculties and a communist with sound pedagogical experience, he neither understood nor accepted in his heart the course of a qualitatively new organization of instruction for the officer candidates or a fundamental modernization of the physical plant of the training process. In front of me lay his report with a request to be discharged into the reserves.

Here is what had happened. Having set out firmly to establish independence for the faculties in selecting the means and forms of work and the right to seek and experiment, we were hoping for the maximum manifestation of each instructor's capabilities and on a rise in the creative return from their work. However, it turned out that not all of the military pedagogues were ready to work actively and persistently under such conditions as well as act not upon command from above but to show their own initiative. Some of them it was easier to follow the years-old methods and the habit of teaching in the old manner, using the old routine outlines, and not to notice the swollen lecture courses and the divorcing of instruction from practice.

The chief of the political section Col Yu. Kalkuta and I were talking about the search on the part of each faculty for its own approaches to activating pedagogical labor and to using new things in developing military pedagogics while the person speaking with us was "frightening" us with the difficulties and dangers which could be

encountered on this path. We gave as an example the experience of the chair headed by Col V. Vasilchenkov, where the active use of the reference outline method has made it possible to save 20 percent of the training time while we were shown the failure which occurred in the introduction of this method on the chair headed by Col V. Danov. But the opponent for some reason added that here the party organization, having analyzed the reasons for the failure, reached the conclusion to support the initiative of the instructors to employ a different method, that is, technical gains which had provided a good effect in instructing the officer candidates.

Independence was also ensured in choosing the means and forms of instruction and, hence, you must think. For example, the communists from one of the faculties felt that it was best to become acquainted with the experience of the innovative teacher V. Shatalov directly on the spot, in Donetsk, if you please. They decided that for the more effective assimilation of it it was essential to go take a look how this experiment was "working" in the Yeysk Military Aviation Pilot School, and off they went. There was an interest in the method of the well known pedagogue from the Moscow area, I. Volkov, and he was to be invited to the school. They went off, they invited and they met. The most important thing was not to stand still, to approach everything from a position of innovativeness and creativity and to achieve decisive shifts and concrete results.

"Forgive me, I am not used to such change in life," the colonel admitted honestly. "For this reason I request that you satisfy my petition for discharge into the reserves...."

We said farewell. And thanks to him that he found the courage to recognize that his adherence to inertia and stereotypic thinking could impede the modernizing of the training and upbringing process.

I will admit that there were just a few instructors who were unable to "fit in" or simply did not want to "fit in" the hassles of restructuring or into a situation of a critical assessment of what had been done, the need for practical searches and a higher level of exactingness and responsibility. But still it is lamentable that we were unable to help them find their place in the general movement forward.

In restructuring the training and upbringing process, we are counting primarily on the knowledge, mind and experience of each man and upon their manifesting of their best qualities. The restructuring itself opens up maximum opportunities for the upbringing of others by life and by personal experience in all our transformations. And it not only opens up. It requires that these opportunities be employed realistically and in fact. Here the party organizations can do a great deal, a very great deal by the strength of their influence, by their activeness and militancy. Particularly if one considers that a pedagogue, as was pointed out at the February (1988) Plenum

of the CPSU Central Committee, is the main element in the restructuring of the entire educational system. And this applies fully to the military school. For instance, at the scientific-procedural conference the idea was voiced that several outstanding officer candidates should be permitted to attend classes as they wished. You will agree that for a military school for its rigid military regimentation and controlled style, such a proposal would be unusual, if not to say inadmissible. This was how it was initially perceived. The first to support it were the candidates of sciences Cols V. Novoseltsev, S. Klimov and V. Savilchenkov, communists who had never waited for any special instructions from above and had set the example of a new approach to the organization of instruction.

So, three officer candidates were given the right to attend class at their discretion. Understandably in practical exercises they were together with all the rest. The quizzes and exams were obligatory for them. As for the rest there was complete independence. What did the results of the semester show? Not merely the successful assimilation of the training course by the officer candidates but rather the carrying out of several interesting scientific developments by them. They mastered the computer equipment better than the others and even wrote computer programs for the assignments of the faculties. These programs are being used by the instructors in the exercises.

The experiment, as they say, came off. In the political and training sections, in studying its results, they have proposed giving the right of free attendance of exercises to the best squad and later on to several-score officer candidates while the most capable of these would be permitted to shift to studying under individual plans....

Of course, the restructuring of the military school is still at the outset. Often we must act following the trial and error method. But it is obvious that the policy of providing independence for the faculties in choosing the methods and forms of work is a progressive phenomenon. The activeness of the men has risen, and their creative potential is more fully disclosed. They grow in knowledge and skills, they propose new ideas and carry them out. They also grow in service. Here I will not mention names or facts. Let me resort to statistics. I think that in the given instance figures will be more persuasive than anything. Over the last 3 years some 2-score men from the command and instructor personnel of the school have left for advanced training at other VUZes and scientific facilities. Five have headed schools. They are communists to whom are linked many of our initiatives in restructuring the training and upbringing process.

One of these is to set up a training production facility making it possible for the officer candidates to participate in actual production activities and opening up fundamentally new opportunities for improving the training process and bringing it closer to practice. All the duties here from motor mechanic, milling machine operator to foreman and chief of the shop are performed by

officer candidates. The responsibility of the instructors has risen greatly for their own personal professional training (here all the assemblies and mechanisms must not be demonstrated broken down or in a mock-up but be able to do a great deal on a highly skilled basis and with one's own hands so that the trainee gains the skill). Practical experience in the sections of the facility has made it possible for us to partially abandon repair practices in the troops and save tens of thousands of rubles annually. Moreover, in joining in actual production activity, the school is able to even assume a portion of the assignments of the motor repair enterprises.

At the recently held reports of the elective party bodies on the restructuring there was a frank and honest discussion of the effectiveness of these major changes in the life of the school collective. What had we been able to do? What was impeding progress? It is a pleasure to point out that in making the analysis, the communists proposed new ideas and looked to the future. This involved the creation of our own information computer laboratory. As well as the elaboration of the model of a specialist "for tomorrow" up to the year 2000. Yes, we already have such a view to the future. And the realization by the school, together with training future motor vehicle officers, of sound technical programs on the basis of contractual work and the obtaining of a portion of the profit for this. There will also be a decisive turn to the wide involvement of the officer candidates in real scientific developments and preparing diploma projects which have practical value. Presently in our school one out of every five defends such a project. It is our plan that each future military motor vehicle engineer can decide to take such a step and upon assignments of the units, enterprises and institutions, with the aid of the faculties, carry out specific developments, prepare the blueprints, manufacture the prototypes and introduce them into practice. Is the load factor on the pedagogues to rise? Certainly without stress and without a search there will be no headway. Thus, we must dare. The times themselves require such an approach.

Someone might think in reading these lines that the Ryazan Motor Vehicle School is taking on too much. I would put it this way: today it is our duty to assume as much as possible, on a daily basis add to the work, give scope to the search, go boldly into experiments and introduce the new and advanced. Here, I feel, creativity and commitment, responsibility and independence will be manifested primarily in this. 10272

Proposal for Reform of Military Higher Education
18010318 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Mar 88 p 2

[Article by Colonel Ye. Zhuravlev, doctor of military sciences: "The Military Scientist. What Should He Be Like?" Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The February (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee noted that the restructuring of the country's

public life and the acceleration of scientific-technical progress are raising the problem of improving qualifications and retraining personnel with unprecedented acuteness. This problem also faces the higher military school, which is called upon to prepare scientific and teaching personnel for the educational institutions and scientific institutes of the Ministry of Defense. The article published today contains several judgments and proposals that, in the opinion of the author, could help to improve the training of military teachers and scientists. It is possible that not all of the article's positions will appear indisputable to readers. We invite you, dear comrades, to take part in the conversation on this subject.

The restructuring of the higher military school is still at the very beginning of the way. And today it is extremely important on the basis of a careful critical analysis once again to compare the main directions of our work with those tasks that flow out of the decisions of the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. For a number of reasons, the system for the training of scientific and scientific-teaching personnel that has developed in recent years does not fully provide for the needs of military research institutions and higher educational institutions. As a result, there has been an acceleration of the aging process of more highly qualified specialists—professors, lecturers, and doctors and candidates of sciences—and this, as you know, curbs the movement of any science.

Whereas the average age of people receiving their doctorates in the United States is 32.5 years and 48 in our country, it exceeds 55 years in the institutions of the Ministry of Defense and is 60 or more for doctors of military sciences. Nor can one consider it normal when the average age of candidates of sciences is 47, whereas for the country as a whole it is 37.

Why has this situation arisen? One of the reasons, in our view, is that the reform of the military school carried out in the mid-1970s created a system that does not allow one to receive the degree of candidate of military sciences earlier than the age of 35 or that of doctor of military sciences before the age of 45. Indeed: a youth entering a military school at the age of 17 or 18 becomes a lieutenant at the age of 21 or 22. To enter a combined arms academy, he must hold the corresponding position. In the best of cases, he receives it after 5 or 6 years. To enter military graduate school, one must graduate from the academy and serve no fewer than 2 years in line units. So it turns out that the officers finish military graduate school at the age of 35 or older.

Psychologists have determined that the optimum age for choosing one's profession is 15 or 16. Unfortunately, the secondary school with its introductory military training in its present-day form does not completely provide for the professional orientation of youths or prepare them for entering military schools. Because they are few in

number, specialized educational institutions—the Suворov academies—cannot meet the requirements of military schools for well-trained graduates. So the obvious conclusion is that it is necessary to think about expanding the network of Suворov academies and about increasing their recruitment of young people dreaming about being professional officers. How can we not recall the special artillery and aviation schools in existence in the years 1937 through 1955? How are they worse than, let us say, the schools with a mathematical or physical bias or with in-depth study of a foreign language?

To restructure, however, means not only to change the existing order. A substantially more serious task is to change the stereotyped thinking, the psychology, and the attitude of people toward the matter of training scientific and teaching personnel. I think that it would be advisable to put the most talented graduates of higher military schools into groups of military researchers and teachers and to send them to military academies so that they can receive a higher military education and pass candidate's examinations. In the process of the instruction in the academies, these students must go through two or three periods of training in line units in their future speciality with a total duration of up to 1 year. As a result, we would have candidates of military sciences and other specialists 25 to 30 years of age. By the age of 35 to 40, they would reach the level of doctor of sciences or professor.

Unquestionably, for the military scientist, the troops and their technical equipment are the object of continuous investigation. To become a scientist or a teacher, however, it is by no means necessary to take all the numerous steps of the large official ladder. Here another approach is necessary: on the basis of the scientific forecasting of the prospects for the development of military affairs, weapons and combat equipment, it is necessary to train on a priority basis manpower resources capable of accelerating scientific-technical progress and of looking more boldly to tomorrow.

The military scientist or teacher is called upon to be not only a propagandist of knowledge and a generator of ideas for students or the research team but also a person called upon to help them understand the fine points of different areas of military science, search methodology and contemporary culture as a whole. From this point of view, the professional training of the military postgraduate as a future military teacher and researcher, must, in our view, be restructured: necessary is not only an intense level of training in the specialty but also knowledge of the history of the development of some area of science or other as well as familiarity with the methods for obtaining this knowledge. Today, as never before, it is important to have knowledge of basic and social sciences, without which it is impossible to develop the precise ideological orientations of the military scientist and teacher. Unfortunately, it has frequently happened that knowledge was basically limited to the dogmatic assimilation of some theoretical positions that were once

correct but now essentially lack a direct relationship to today's problems in the development of military science, military technology and the armed forces as a whole.

Higher military educational institutions must graduate specialists who immediately after finishing the VUZ could carry on developments at an advanced level, who would be familiar with the state of affairs in their specialization in the world, and who would be able to choose the most effective ways to achieve the set goal. And here I would like to say something about the study of foreign languages.

By no means all young teachers and teachers have a command of foreign languages. Statistics show that only one of seven colleagues of a research institute, design bureau or VUZ is capable of grasping publications on his speciality written in a language "learned" in the school, military school or academy. In most cases, there can be no talk about the fluent and systematic reading of original foreign-language sources by military postgraduates and even young scientists. And what can be the value of translations that appear in some publications after 2 or 3 years! In addition, the deep-rooted "lingual dependence" leads to a loss of time and to considerable expenditures: translations are 10 to 20 times more expensive than the reading of the texts by the specialists themselves.

At the same time, it is well known that the extent of linguistic knowledge necessary for the sure reading of literature in most scientific-technical disciplines is not all that great. It can be learned in 2 or 3 weeks of intensive lessons in the language. This is confirmed both by the methods of candidate of psychological sciences V. Milashkevich and by the experience of the department of foreign languages of the Siberian Section of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the teaching of scientific-technology translation. It would not be a bad idea to recommend these methods to the Main Administration of Military Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense for broad use in military schools, institutes and academies.

Perhaps one of the most characteristic features of our time is the reassessment of values. Today many things about which songs of praise were composed quite recently have begun to be called by their rightful names. This painful but quite necessary process is also taking place within military VUZ's. These are the first steps of perestroika that are probably the most difficult of all. But without them there is no future. And it is also senseless without military economy.

A firm knowledge of the bases of this discipline the command of the methods of functional value analysis is essential for any military specialist. Today, as never before, it is important to develop the programs of the candidate's examination for military postgraduates and aspirants as well as to develop textbooks and instruction manuals in this subject.

The mastering of the methods of mathematical modeling and computer technology require special attention. Unfortunately, we are in the initial stage of the application of information science and computerization of our education. If we compare the data on the United States with what we have in our country, the picture is depressing. The problem is aggravated by the fact that we still have no industrial production of computer software and what industry does issue for broad consumption is often at yesterday's level.

In a single article, of course, it is impossible to raise and uncover all the problems in the training of military scientists and teachers. My colleagues probably have different opinions on the questions that were raised. One way or another, we must clearly acknowledge that our armed forces are entering into a new stage of development and that a new military doctrine requires its own approaches to the resolution of a whole series of problems and direct ties with science. The maintenance of parity in the military area also requires a high level of general scientific and professional training of future military scientists, researchers and teachers. This is the order of the day.

9746

Questioning Validity of Admissions to Suvorov Schools

18010357 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Apr 88 p 2

[Article by Maj N. Burbyga under "Prompted by the Editor's Mail" rubric: "Who Should Attend a Suvorov School?"]

[Text] "A year ago, the mother of Vitaliy Titor died and, even before that, he lost his father, Ensign Ivan Leontyevich Titor of our unit. The boy remained quite alone—he had no other relatives on the side of his father or mother. By the way, they were both raised in children's homes. This year, Vitaliy was about to enter the Moscow Suvorov Military School. He had long dreamed of this. Unfortunately, his dream was not realized. He received a two [poor] in the physics examination and was not admitted to the school. This was a blow for him and we do not know what his fate will now be. Could you help Vitaliy? Can there really be no exceptions for such cases? We know Vitaliy and his capabilities well and can guarantee that he will study hard and will become a worthy officer. And the fact that he neglected his studies and did not pass the examination is quite explainable. Having lost his parents and being left alone, what could studies mean to him? "We beg of you—help...."

This letter came to the editor's office in August of last year. It was signed by officers of N-skiy Garrison and members of their families, more than 50 signatures altogether. And following the letter, two of its authors—members of the women's council V. Kasykhina and N. Kurganova—came to the editor's office. Vitaliy Titor

was also with them. We will say at once that we were not able to help Vitaliy. The response to the appeal of the editor's office to the leadership of the VUZ's of the Ground Forces, to the director of the Moscow Suvorov Military School was categorical: there are no exceptions to the existing rules for admission and a person given an unsatisfactory evaluation in entrance exams cannot be a pupil at a Suvorov school.

Well, rules are rules and they must be observed. In the case at hand, the editor's office did not and does not have any reason to accuse officials of heartlessness. But as for the rules themselves.... One involuntarily thinks: is everything about them well-founded, expedient and well thought out?

Let us recall the history of the Suvorov schools. They were established in 1943 at the very height of the Great Patriotic War and they admitted basically the children of soldiers and commanders, partisans, and Soviet and party workers who died in battles with the fascists. And no son of influential and well-to-do parents, as long as those parents were alive, had any advantage over orphans in being enrolled in the school. This was fair, this was in the traditions of our nation and its army—general concern about deprived children. The children of regiments, wards in children's homes, and even homeless waifs became pupils of Suvorov schools and subsequently officers. Many of them attained high posts and practically all of them became worthy people and were of considerable benefit to the society.

Is this tradition continuing today?

It is now a different time, of course, and living conditions have changed. But do we really have few orphan children and wards of boarding schools and children's homes? Such children, however, make up only 3 to 4 percent of the pupils at Suvorov schools (last year's figures). There is still another alarming fact in these statistics: children of peasants account for 2.2 percent of the pupils in the schools. On the other hand, about half are children of office workers, primarily workers in the area of trade, services and administration. Children of servicemen account for 27.3 percent.

No, there are no restrictions (except, of course, restrictions uniform to all for medical reasons) for wards of children's homes or, let us say, for rural children. But the rules for admission to the schools, under which the main condition for admission is high marks on examinations, essentially reduce the chance of these young people to attend Suvorov schools to zero. Can, for example, a youth from a remote village or a children's home compete equally in knowledge with someone his same age who finished school, let us say, in a large city or in the capital? Especially if the mama and papa of this individual have a higher education and, as frequently happens, hire a tutor for their son.

Here, of course, it is necessary to make a reservation. The demands now being put on officers are very high. And those who are clearly incapable can naturally not be officers. But one can hardly agree with the existing situation either. Clearly, from the point of social fairness, it would be logical to give a preferential right of admission to pupils from children's homes and boarding schools and to youths from families with many children. Under the indispensable condition, of course, that they choose their career carefully. This is the opinion not only of the authors of letters to the editor but also of some commanders and teachers of Suvorov schools. Commanders of companies of Suvorov pupils at the Kalinin School told me not without irony: "We are doing very well in the training, for basically we take the elite and do not have to try very hard. But such work is not satisfying, especially when you know that most of the rural youths and those from children's homes could not compete."

Is it possible that there are no worthy candidates among them to attend Suvorov schools? I spoke with workers at a number of children's homes and everywhere the picture is the same: there are several youths in each of the senior classes who want to and could attend Suvorov schools but in most cases no one even tries to be admitted to the school, because the experience of their predecessors over many years has repeatedly convinced them that this is almost useless.

"Among our pupils are engineers and teachers, people of creative occupations," said N. Oleynik, deputy director of the Moscow Children's Home No 50, "but I cannot remember anyone being admitted to a Suvorov school. There was not a single instance in the last 30 years."

He expressed the following thought: if the children's home were given even one authorized place in a Suvorov school, this would be an excellent incentive for the children. The educators are certain that among many youths there would be a real fight for the right to receive this place and the one having it would be most worthy. Why can such a practice not be introduced?

Indeed, why not?

Our reader Reserve Col V. Gastello, son of a legendary flier and himself a former Suvorov pupil, thinks that there must be exceptions to the rules of admission for unforeseen cases but applied precisely to youths from children's homes and sons of servicemen who died performing their military duty and that neither the official position nor the "influential" possibilities of parents must play a decisive role in arranging the training of their children. The latter condition is especially important.

Life shows, nevertheless, that the rules for admission to schools are sometimes violated and by no means in favor of youths from children's homes or rural areas. Our reader Konstantin Timofeyevich Kivel from the settlement of Glukhariny in Magadan Oblast reported that in

seeking admission to Ussuriysk Suvorov Military School, his son accumulated the necessary number of points but was not admitted to the school. But some boys whose fathers carry weight received two's and were nonetheless admitted.

In checking out the letter, the facts were confirmed. The son of Konstantin Timofeyevich was admitted to the school and, to some extent, justice triumphed. If only this were an isolated case. In the mail from readers, which, as a rule, increases during the time of entrance examinations, there are many letters reporting on instances of admission to schools according to special lists and on the fact that some of those receiving two's are even allowed to take the exams again. The administration of the VUZ's of the Ground Forces also receives such letters. By no means are the facts always confirmed. But sometimes the readers are right. "Krasnaya Zvezda" told about one such case in the article "Moral Choice" published on 30 January of this year.

Do not such instances indicate that there are loopholes in the existing rules for admission that are sometimes utilized to admit not the most worthy youths to the school but those whose relatives carry considerable official or public weight?

At Kalinin School, I got to know the contents of one interesting file. It contained various petitions about Suvorov candidates. Col Gen Avn V. Abramov (now retired), former deputy commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces for VUZ's, signed a petition on the grandson of one general, Maj Gen Avn V., Baranov on "the son of our coworker...." Many petitions were written on the letterheads of deputies, ministries, reputable institutions and departments....

Can it be that some of these youths are orphans of members of families with many children? Nothing of the kind. Materially they are very well off. The only thing that distinguishes them is their frankly meager success in their studies, which gives them practically no chance not only to take competitive exams but even to go through the preliminary selection in the military commissariats.

We can sympathize with the directors of the schools: it is not easy for them to stand up to such a powerful siege by officials. It is sometimes necessary for them to capitulate, especially since they do not have the penetrating persistence of the "besiegers." But we can also sympathize with the son of a mother with many children from a remote area or with a youth from a children's home: they can rely only on themselves.

Here it is also necessary to touch on an important aspect. The prestige of the Suvorov schools is now very high. As practice shows, however, there are not that many youths among those being admitted who have a great desire to go there. It very often turns out that their parents made the choice for them. Every year, unfortunately, there are more and more mamas and papas who, having just one

son, try to saddle the army with the obligation to educate and support him, which, by the way, is very costly. There are those who see in the Suvorov schools only the possibility of removing their son from the influence of the street or of freeing their own hands so that they can arrange their personal lives. At least, they say, the school will not let the boy be a good-for-nothing and, better yet, they will teach him something.

Having come to the Kalinin school from Azerbaijan, Elmar Yusifov did not even appear for the examination in composition. We got to talking. It turned out that he had no desire to study at a Suvorov school, much less to become an officer. Why did he go?

"Mama insisted."

It is quite clear that the main and sole purpose of the schools is to prepare a worthy replenishment for the military educational institutions. In the selection, therefore, one must without fail take into account the sincere desire to become an officer and the capability of doing so. But under the existing rules for admittance and the tremendous competition, there is no serious individual investigation of the matriculant and, the main thing, there is no professional-psychological selection.

What must be the selection system for Suvorov schools that would ensure their being filled with the most worthy youths from among those who are most in need of state aid? Clearly, competent specialists should seek the answer to this question. One thing is obvious: it is essential to make the vocational selection of the matriculants the basis and psychologists, psychophysicists and sociologists should deal with this. At the same time, it is necessary to carry out this selection under the conditions of broad glasnost. This is what Maj V. Poplavskiy proposes in his letter to the editor's office: "It is necessary to establish commissions in the rayons that will include representatives of departments of education and public health, the Komsomol raykom, the military commissariat and other agencies and organizations that will determine precisely who among those desiring to be Suvorov pupils should be given preference. The weighed and well-founded recommendations of these commissions must have considerable force in the enrollment in the schools." It appears that this proposal is entirely in the spirit of the time and the aims of the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee having to do with the democratization of education.

And a second aspect of considerable importance: the holding of entrance exams and the filling of the schools obviously must also be carried out in an atmosphere of broad glasnost. In such an approach, it will be possible to avoid those negative aspects that are being encountered rather frequently today.

7 July 1988

18 MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

The next selection of Suvorov candidates will begin within just a few weeks. Who will they be? Very much will depend upon the position of the military commissariats that have been given the obligation of carrying out the selection of the candidates. As they reported in the administration of the VUZ's of the Ground Forces, the military commissariats are oriented toward giving preference to orphans, children of servicemen who died performing their duties, and youths from families with

many children. But an orientation does not yet mean a guarantee that the problem will be resolved. The basic documents under which the selection is made are the Statute on the Suvorov Schools and the conditions for admittance to them have remained the same.

Will the situation change this year?

9746

Vinogradov Examines U.S.-Japanese Defense Ties in Wake of INF Treaty

18010096a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jan 88 pp 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA international columnist, in the Military-Political Review section: "Japan-U.S.: The Well-Trodden Road of Militarization," first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] A Pilgrimage Abroad—Tokyo Supports the American "Initiative"—From An Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier to Real Aircraft Carriers"

Leaders of the Japanese Government opened the new year's "political season" with a series of visits to the United States. Both Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Uno and Prime Minister N. Takeshita have completed their pilgrimage across the ocean, and now Director General, Japan Defense Agency Ts. Kawara is being sent there. This is to be expected, for Tokyo invariably sees its relationship with Washington as the "corner-stone" of the Land of the Rising Sun's foreign policy.

In light of the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting, the discussion of the world strategic military situation in the world, to include the situation in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean area in light of the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting, was at the center of the negotiations in Washington. The signing of the U.S.-USSR treaty on eliminating intermediate and shorter range missiles created some major repercussions in Japan. Many influential political figures, mass anti-war active organizations and large sectors of society considered this agreement an historic event in post-war history.

It is apparent that Japanese leadership has expressed its support for the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles. However, as the TOKYO SHIMBUN newspaper shows, hidden behind this is a guarded attitude toward the results of Soviet-American summit meeting. The unofficial review of the world situation in 1987 and the perspective for its development in 1988 as was prepared by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically states that, "one should not develop an optimistic, pacifistic attitude" such as was prevalent after the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles was concluded. The SANKEY SHIMBUN newspaper states that the Japanese Foreign Ministry feels that a "profound atmosphere of peace will be a minus for the West" and in that article they stressed the necessity of "increasing the solidarity of the Western camp" was stressed in that article.

And it was precisely this political baggage that accompanied Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister to Washington. They clearly differed with the declarative statements about the adherence to disarmament which they do not accept. As is obvious from press

reports, tete-a-tete talks in Washington gave no hint of Tokyo's readiness to repudiate its part in the arms race. All of the talks were held in the spirit of the former course toward confrontation with the socialist world. Japan's military budget for the upcoming fiscal year which begins 1 April in that country and that was approved on the eve of N. Takeshita's departure abroad could not but make the American Administration happy. Its growth is envisioned at 5.2 percent and at the same time there is a 10 percent increase planned for Japanese expenditures on the maintenance of American bases and forces in Japan, bringing that total to 120.3 billion yen.

Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci praised Tokyo for the high growth rate of its military expenditures. But he also demanded more. I will explain exactly what happened. A new abbreviation appeared in the pages of American newspapers and on the lips of television commentators as early as late last year. That abbreviation was "STI" which expands to "balanced technological initiative." What is the essence of this latest American "initiative"? It turned out that this is an extensive program to create fundamentally new types of non-nuclear weapons with increased accuracy and destructive force. The television news company CBS indicated that with the help of these weapons, the Pentagon hopes to "close the gaps" which, as the Pentagon suggests, will create the realization of the Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Ballistic Missiles.

And as has already been reported, that same week the special commission on developing recommendations for long-term U.S. strategy presented President R. Reagan with the fruits of its labors—a report entitled "Differentiated Restraint." This report discussed the need to reorient U.S. military strategy and it pushed its recommendation that the U.S. train for military operations using "highly accurate non-nuclear weapons" and specifically cruise missiles whose creation became possible as a result of the development of computer technology and micro-electronics. All of this is to provide the United States "overwhelming superiority on the battlefield." This is essentially the "balanced technological initiative"!

It is clear the the U.S. does not plan to carry out its dangerous plans alone. It intends to bring its primary allies into the realization of those plans and Japan is being assigned one of the leading roles. This is more than just distributing the financial load of the new, very expensive American "initiative." According to the creators of STI, the powerful Japanese scientific and technical potential is practically irreplaceable in the creation of the latest types of weapons such as: automated airplanes, robot tanks, radar that will automatically direct missiles and torpedoes, and computers for automated systems to control combat operations.

Thus, during his visit to the U.S. Prime Minister N. Takeshita gave a positive answer to the possibility of Japan taking part in the American "initiative," but

Japan Defense Agency Director General Ts. Kawa openedly stated that the decision to take part in STI is a matter for the very near future. A representative delegation of Pentagon experts is already in Japan. They are involved in the preliminary selection of technology suitable for the development of new non-nuclear weapons. For this reason the delegation is visiting factories and scientific research laboratories in the Japanese electronic and machine-building corporations.

And at the same time the creators of the notorious Strategic Defense Initiative are "getting their hands" on Japanese scientific and technological ideas. Tokyo signed an agreement on the conditions for taking part in the American Star Wars Program last summer. And now, in order to urge the Japanese, Washington is proposing that Tokyo take part in the development of an "anti-ballistic system for the theater of combat operations." And they are trying to entice Tokyo with promises that such a system would allow them to create an "anti-ballistic defense net" in the airspace around Japan. They envision the creation of a computer-controlled radar system with new air defense missiles and electromagnetic cannons able to, so they say, to destroy sea-based intermediate and shorter range missiles. The authors of this recommendation are also not hiding the fact that, as an Asiatic type of SDI, this new system would become a critical supplement to the American Star Wars Program or even an integral part of it.

Just as in the case of STI, statesmen from the Japan Defense Agency all but used both hands to vote for Japan's participation in this new project. The fact is that in Tokyo the future for disarmament is not convenient for those circles who are building a policy based on maintaining tension in the world. They are clearly trying to reduce the importance of the Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Ballistic Missiles in improving the international situation. For example this same Japan Defense Agency Director General Ts. Kawara maintains that "the military situation has not changed" in Asia. And he comes to one simple conclusion from this: Japan must continue to go at full speed to realize its five-year militaristic program. And so that it is more convincing to the Japanese, they are again being intimidated by the "perfidy of the Russians" and by fabrications about the increased "Soviet military presence" around Japan.

Recent events clearly confirm that influential circles at the highest echelons of Japanese power intend to hold their previous militaristic positions, refuse to correct their military policy and continue to think along the lines of old stereotypes even after the historic signing of the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Ballistic Missiles. The government has agreed to allocate enormous funds to accomplish a whole "set" of military programs. For example, 15 billion yen is being spent simply to equip a center for tracking submarines. They plan to spend enormous sums such as that for the development of a new generation of support fighter, to

purchase the super-modern Inzhis firing system for ships and to construct powerful over-the-horizon radar sites. And without any long explanation here it is obvious that Japanese ruling circles are undertaking a "major leap" in military construction which will elevate the country's military potential to a significantly higher level.

But even this is not enough for them. The IOMIURY newspaper initially told its readers about a certain secret Japanese Naval plan to get an aircraft carrier into its inventory. And then Naval Chief of Staff Admiral S. Khigasiyama himself confirmed the Japanese admirals' "urgent desire." According to information from IOMIURY they have already selected the type aircraft carrier that they want. It is the same model as the British Invincible which has a water displacement of up to 16,000 tons and can carry eight to ten Sea Harrier VTOL [vertical take-off and landing] aircraft. The inclusion of new aircraft carriers into the Japanese naval inventory had to be included in the new program for expanded militaristic training which covers the period 1991-1995. And the statement by the Japanese admirals that they need the aircraft for purely "defensive reasons" can hardly confuse anyone. The same IOMIURY stresses that there is nothing preventing these ships from being used to conduct offensive operations.

In his day former Prime Minister Nakasone promised his ally across the ocean that he would turn Japan into an unsinkable "aircraft carrier." And he later led the country down the well-trodden road of militarization. His successors have decided not to turn away from this dangerous route. They planned to reinforce the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" with real aircraft carriers. And Tokyo cannot but bring very serious dangers to Japan's neighbors with this policy. The Pyongyang newspaper MINCHZHU CHOSON writes, "The expansion of armed forces and weapons that Japan is carrying out under the guise of 'defense' and its increased military alliance with the U.S. is further increasing tension in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean area." And in a commentary devoted to the increase in Japan's military appropriations the Indonesian ANTARA Agency correctly reminds us that peace and security cannot be maintained by expanding military power.

The Tokyo leadership is increasingly stressing its desire to have a more active role in the international association, one that is comparable to Japan's position as the second economic power in the Capitalist world. But as facts show, they see this "active role" as nothing but strengthening the might of its armed forces and expanding its military alliance with the United States. And this in no way fits the interests of the Country of the Rising Sun or its neighbors.

**NATO R & D on Smaller, Quieter, More
Maneuverable Subs Examined**

18010246 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Mar 88 p 4

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank A. Biryusov entitled: "Military-Technical Review: Small Displacement Submarines". The title is followed by a box with the phrases: "The concept of 'forward defense'—Maneuverability and secrecy—In the race for purchase orders".]

[Text] The concept of "forward defense," well known in NATO and developed primarily to suit the actions of ground forces, has recently been finding more and more supporters in the command of the naval forces of the NATO countries. "Forward defense" on the seas, in the view of the bloc admiralty, presupposes active offensive operations in naval theaters, including directly along the coast of the probable enemy, and in the approaches to his naval bases and important shore facilities.

Submarines with a small displacement are one of the means for armed combat on the seas that most fully meet the requirements of this concept. According to the journal, "Marine Rundschau," they must be taken into account "in carrying out combat operations in closed naval theaters and in coastal waters."

In the building of submarines with a conventional diesel-electric power plant during the last 20 years, the journal notes, there has been a tendency toward an increase in size, speed, range, diving depth and effectiveness of weapons. Nevertheless, observers emphasize, it is expedient in some maritime regions and in carrying out certain tasks to utilize submarines with a small displacement (from 100-150 to 600-700 tons).

In the opinion of foreign military experts, such submarines have a number of advantages compared with large and medium-size vessels: lower costs for production and operation, insignificant expenditures for the establishment of a system of coastal basing, material and technical supply, and personnel training. In addition, it is noted that their actions are more secret in the coastal zone, where the use of medium and large-displacement submarines is impossible or extremely difficult.

The small dimensions, low noise level, and possibility of operating along the coast with a minimum risk of being detected permit the submarines with a small displacement to deliver missile and torpedo strikes against targets in the coastal zone; to lay mines at the mouths of rivers, in anchorages, in the approaches to naval bases and ports, as well as in narrows; to land diversionary groups in regions of important coastal facilities; and to carry on reconnaissance at periscope depth in a limited area over an extended period of time.

Along with the performance of tasks in the coastal zone, their use in the open seas is not precluded. At the same time, it is considered that because of their greater secrecy they can be more effective than submarines with a medium displacement. "It is still necessary to check out whether it is not better to utilize three small-displace-

ment submarines on the borders than two of medium size," notes one of the issues of "Marine Rundschau."

The navy of the FRG is paying particular attention to small submarines. The Bundesmarine (FRG navy) includes 24 submarines of the 205 and 206 designs (displacement up to 500 tons) and the shipyards have developed a whole series of projects for submarines with a displacement of 150 to 500 tons. The plans provide for different arms on board, including the antiship missile system, "Harpoon" or SM 39. The submarines have a large radius of tactical operations and possess good maneuverability and a high speed of underwater travel. The surface range can reach 5,000 miles and, when utilizing the electric engines underwater, 100 miles at a speed of 4 knots. The diving depth is 150 meters or more.

According to the journal "International Defense Review," abroad they are widely advertising the mini-submarine of Project 250 (displacement 250 tons, diving depth 50 to 60 meters, crew of seven to nine people), believing that it will interest the countries of the Persian Gulf. Among the merits of the submarine, besides traditional torpedoes, they include the fact that it can utilize up to six antiship missiles and carry four naval mines. Judging by the reports of the foreign press, Saudi Arabia has shown interest, together with other countries of the Red Sea basin and the Persian Gulf region, in the purchase of eight or more submarines from the FRG at a total cost of up to \$1.4 billion.

Besides the FRG, Italy produces small submarines. The most up-to-date project is S101 for a submarine with a displacement of 650 tons. The speed of the submarine is 17 knots, the tactical radius of action is 4,000 miles, and the armament is six 533-mm torpedo tubes. Thanks to the high degree of automation, the ship's crew does not exceed 20.

The English shipyard "Vickers" also developed a model of a small submarine "Piranha" with a displacement of up to 150 tons intended for the performance of special operations. The submarine can transport up to 10 divers with full gear. In addition, its torpedo version is also being developed. Its tactical radius of action is 800 miles. Its surface range at a speed of 7 knots can reach 1,800 miles. The maximum speed under the electric engines reaches 9 knots and the range underwater is approximately 70 miles (at a speed of 4 knots).

Nor has France been left out. The Marseilles firm COMEX developed the submarine "Saga 1" with a surface displacement of 290 tons and an underwater displacement of 545 tons. Its maximum speed underwater is 6 knots, the diving depth is up to 600 meters, and it takes 13 people on board (crew of 7 and 6 divers).

Foreign military observers note that the interest in submarines with a small displacement is growing and therefore it should be expected that their numbers in the navies of Western countries will increase.

**Komsomol Secretary Responds to Letter on
Mistreatment of Afghan Vets**

18010236a Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian 7 May 88 p 1

[Interview with Sergey Yepifantsev, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, by V. Yudanov: "The Teaching of Courage".]

[Text] [Introductory Letter] "For 2 years now, our committee of internationalist soldiers has been functioning in Promyshlennyy Rayon of Stavropol. We are some 200 reserve soldiers, 18 men have received orders and medals and 6 are disabled. We consider our main task to be the military patriotic education of the youth, and preparation for service in the army. But we have nothing to boast about: the juvenile clubs are seriously unequipped and quarters are not provided for new ones.

"But most insulting is the fact that the local authorities look on us with doubt. We can rely only on ourselves even in such a sacred matter as aid to the disabled and to the families of deceased servicemen. We wanted to set up our own rural cooperative but again a hitch: they would not provide land for the plots.

"We are not intriguers and we talk about everything openly, although some of the leaders do not like this. They have grown accustomed to sham parade but fear the problems. We consider ourselves to be soldiers of revolutionary restructuring and are ready, as in Afghanistan, to fight to the end for our just cause."

V. Shupletsov, A. Romashchenko and others (a total of 21 signatures)

[End of Introductory Letter]

[Question] For a half year now, there has been a sharp change in the mood of letters from the internationalist soldiers while previously complaints prevailed on the failure to observe governmental benefits for the "Afghaners," now more and more often a different note is sounded: the relationships of the local authorities with the military patriotic clubs and with the movement of reserve young servicemen. We feel that the collective signature under the above-given letter is proof of certain new events in this category of youth.

[Answer] Yes, actually for a long time the skills of yesterday's soldiers, the need for action instilled by service, the high potential of civil duty, the international education and army knowledge which have developed in the men serving in Afghanistan have not been employed or employed extremely little.

How things go for these fellows in "civvics" has depended largely precisely upon the Komsomol and upon the Komsomol Central Committee. But at that

time we, trusting in the happy papers and reports, stubbornly feigned that there were no problems for the Komsomol members who returned home from the army and from Afghanistan.

At the same time before our very eyes the system of training youth for army service was becoming withered and decrepit. Paperwork on the "military patriotic theme" was replacing vital, true work.

In being concerned by this, yesterday's soldiers and officers in many cities of the nation began organizing military patriotic clubs, reserve soldier councils and all sorts of associations which at that time, so to speak, entered the list of "informal." Their problems and misfortunes are generally known as there was no official recognition and, hence, help and support.

The 20th Komsomol Conference which was crucial for the entire youth league drew attention to all these questions. The congress delegates and the Komsomol Central Committee concluded that the efforts of the reserve servicemen had to be united in order with their aid to revitalize the decrepit forms of military patriotic education. To put it figuratively, to connect the current of youth initiative to the failing mechanism for indoctrinating real men. The First All-Union Assembly of Young Reserve Servicemen which assembled last autumn in Ashkhabad demonstrated how timely such a decision was. The results of the Ashkhabad assembly were approved and supported. A decree of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau was adopted on the initiative of reserve servicemen. And this was an accomplishment of the fellows themselves who defended their right to confidence.

At present, the initiative is getting underway in a qualitatively new system of coordinates. The fellows have figured up the costs for training for army service in the school and have already concluded a "contract" with the Ministry of Defense to train a good number of military instructors from young reserve servicemen. The movement has gained social importance. I will not dissemble: far from all the "Afghaners" and certainly not a majority of the young "reservists" responded to the appeal of the Ashkhabad assembly. But the over-all mood has actually changed. At present there is a matter to which we must apply hand and head. Confidence in the fellows is complete and they are both the commanders and the commissars of the movement.

The task for the real men is great and serious, that is, to train the defenders of the motherland, to aid the wounded fellow servicemen and the families of the deceased. For this reason the fellows have drawn closer and closer together as they have realized that they cannot do it alone and they must be together. They have begun to demand more from themselves and from others. They have begun to seek out new approaches instead of the hackneyed "measures." In a word, they are searching for their place in today's difficult life.

The concern of the internationalist soldiers from Stavropol is valid. It does happen that the fellows must overcome resistance. Activists of the initiative group from Kaliningrad Oblast, Ilya Malkov and Vladimir Gombalevskiy, in no way could find a common tongue with the leaders of the town of Bagrationovsk and the oblast center. And the two fine already "going" clubs are languishing without quarters or equipment, without wage schedules for the freed workers. And Ilya Malkov, the secretary of the Bagrationovsk Komsomol gorkom was not even "let go" for the last meeting of the initiative group.

As the fellows from the Altay have related, in the kray center there are school gymnasiums which stand empty. They could be opened for the clubs but the public education bodies are still waiting for some order or instructions....

Few places show understanding for the initiative of the associations of recent soldiers to create youth housing facilities. The "Afghan MZhK [Youth Housing Facilities] have been organized in the suburban Moscow town of Lobnya and Kaluga.... But that is it. The desire of the fellows to participate in solving the housing problem and build themselves in order to live together is enormous.

I speak of these difficulties in no way out of a desire to complain of negligent leaders. I am wondering how to help the fellows? Certainly this is a Komsomol concern of ours: to defend the youth movement and protect its rights. In the youth law the draft of which is being worked out now, guarantees will be provided for the youth associations. But is it worth wasting time waiting for the law? The Komsomol bodies even now should become the defenders of the initiative of the young reserve soldiers. Such rights have been given to the Komsomol. Among the Komsomol workers there are soviet deputies and members of the youth affairs commissions. Use these powers so as to defend the rights of the rank-and-file Komsomol members! There is no need to be afraid and in the party bodies sharply raise the questions of the fate of the military patriotic clubs and work for understanding and support in the party committees.

[Question] Acquaintance with the plans of the initiative group gives rise to the question: Is not the fulcrum of forces too small for the enthusiasm of the young soldiers? The training of youth for army service is an important matter. Doesn't everything come down to "military games"? There is a valid desire of the internationalist soldiers to supervise the execution of the benefits granted to them. But can everything be reduced solely to this? Isn't the ardor of the fellows dampened, and isn't their desire to participate in the processes of restructuring dissipated, as the "Afghaners" from Stavropol wrote?

[Answer] Certainly the fellows themselves would not permit everything to be reduced to "playing at war." And the fight for benefits is probably not the most important goal.

Do you think that they talk about this alone in the meetings and discussions? The fellows discuss all questions which concern each of us now: the situation in the economy, politics, prices, cooperatives.... Our difficult times provide more than enough food for discussion! And this is not idle chatter but rather the search for one's place in resolving the numerous problems of our present life.

In the best of the existing military patriotic clubs, primary attention is given to the ideological and moral tempering of the juveniles and to indoctrinating civil feelings. Among the club leaders there are true political fighters capable of leading the youth and rebuffing all sorts of shouters and demagogues presently swarming around the various "informal" groupings.

The post-service youth, and particularly the internationalist soldiers, is our reserve in modernizing the Komsomol personnel. Presently there are fellows with decorations for Afghanistan both in the Komsomol Central Committee and on the Komsomol obkoms and gorkoms. Thus, the first secretary of the Gryazi Komsomol gorkom in Lipetsk Oblast is Nikolay Komarov, a reserve sergeant who has been decorated with combat orders and medals. He also leads the city council of his fellow Afghan veterans.

Or the following issue. The interest in the movement of the reserve servicemen is great not only in our country. Overseas contemporaries and representatives of the mass information media want to know about such a strong initiative and its leaders. The members of the initiative group are already acting in the role of people's diplomats, carrying the truth about restructuring and our foreign policy to thousands of contemporaries abroad....

[Question] The all-Union association which is to be established will bring together representatives of a movement which has largely already been formed and defended the right to exist. Has not the next bureaucratic superstructure or "apparatus for the apparatus" already been organized? Will not the germs of the "paper disease" penetrate in this manner into the movement which was initially democratic and independent?

[Answer] Again, I am convinced that the young reserve servicemen themselves will not allow this. They have strong immunity against the paper disease. In their milieu they will not tolerate "bureaucrats" capable of merely waiting for commands from above.

We can see a very interesting mosaic picture coming into being. Each club and council is significant in its own way. Here a moral political focus predominates with strong disputes and debates. In another association the military technical questions are of chief concern and in a third it is athletics. There are varying voices but all in all, we feel, there should be a pleasant melody. The clubs and associations need not be like one another. Let a minor or young person have the right to choose: everyone is fed up with life according to a single scenario.

Should we keep the complete "independence" of each club or council or must we create on their basis an all-Union association—this will be settled by the assembly of leaders and officer candidates from the military patriotic clubs which is to be held during the current year. But in any event whether or not there will be an association the very "cells" of the movement will keep their names, emblems and focus.

There is the opinion that the all-Union association should be set up under the aegis of the existing organizations such as the Komsomol, DOSAAF and so forth. Why? Let the Komsomol, DOSAAF and the Army help the movement get on its feet and support it. Then things are in the hands of the young reserve servicemen themselves.

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Motorized Rifle Unit Arrives in Termez*18010400 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian**22 May 88 Second Edition p 1*

[100-word article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Astafev entitled: "At Friendship Bridge".]

[Text] Yesterday another motorized rifle unit from the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan arrived at the Friendship bridge across the Amudarya.

The unit was one of the first to come to the aid of the neighboring country at the request of the legal Afghani government. The high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to [the following] soldier-internationalists of the unit, Senior Lieutenant N. Shornikov, Lieutenant G. Demchenko (both posthumously) and to Private S. Ugolchenko. The Order of Lenin marked the victory of Lieutenant A. Stovba.

The first deputy commander of the forces of the Turkistan Military District, Lieutenant General B. Shein accepted the report on the completion of the march to the home land. Thereafter a meeting was held. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan V. Antonov, chairman of the council of veterans of war and labor of the Termez Rayon Kh. Imamov, and other comrades were present.

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